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Judicial Review of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission
Chicago Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
In a September, 1979, decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals refused to review an administrative decision to suspend trad-
ing in the Chicago Board of Trade wheat contracts made by the
Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC).' Based on a
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),2 which ex-
cepts from judicial review those actions which by law are commit-
ted to agency discretion, the court held that judicial review would
inhibit the unfettered discretion which is necessary to effectively
regulate the volatile futures area. This ruling will provide a detri-
mental effect on participation in the futures market if it creates a
perception that the exchange is no longer a free market in the
traditional sense, but now one subject to the risk of government
interference. This is not to say that regulation of the commodities
market is undesirable, but this additional risk (that an arbitrary
and unreviewable government action will deprive participants of
their opportunity to transact in the market) may drive some par-
ticipants away.
The CFTC was created by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974,3 which amended the existing Commodity
Exchange Act,4 in order to better regulate the expanding futures
field. The CFTC replaced the commodity exchanges themselves
1. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 605 F.2d 1016
(7th Cir. 1979).
2. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576, 701-706
(1976)) [hereinafter cited as APA]. The Act's application section provides:
"(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that-) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
3. Pub. I- No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter cited as 1974 Act].
4. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1976)).
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and the Commodity Exchange Authority (an arm of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture that was the forerunner of the CFTC)5 in po-
licing commodity trading and protecting those participating in the
futures market.
"Futures trading" is the act of entering into a contract for future
delivery of a commodity. A wheat futures contract on the Chicago
Board of Trade is a contract, made on, or subject to, the rules of the
Board of Trade, in which one party agrees to sell and deliver and
the other party agrees to buy and receive 5000 bushels of wheat at
a specified price in a designated month in the future.6 This con-
tract is performed or "settled" by either delivery in the manner
required by the Board of Trade with an exchange of title in the
commodity delivered from seller to buyer, or by offsetting the ini-
tial contract with a reverse transaction in the futures market.
Under the latter situation the participant would then own both a
contract to buy and a contract to sell which would effectively can-
cel his involvement in the market. The price differential between
the two contracts would determine whether the participant real-
izes a profit or suffers a loss.
7
The CFTC was given broad authority to regulate futures trading
practices in order to prevent dealers from taking advantage of par-
ticipants 8 and to monitor the market operations to avoid "those
forms of speculative activity which often demoralize the markets
to the injury of producers, consumers, and the exchanges them-
selves." 9 To prevent these demoralizing actions, the CFTC was
granted the power to declare an emergency with respect to a com-
modity:
[WIhenever it has reason to believe that an emergency exists, [and] to
take such action as, in the Commission's judgment, is necessary to main-
tain or restore orderly trading in, or liquidation of, any futures contract.
The term 'emergency' as used herein shall mean, in addition to threatened
or actual market manipulations and corners, any act of the United States
or a foreign government affecting a commodity or any other major market
disturbance which prevents the market from accurately reflecting the
sources of supply and demand for such commodity .... 10
5. Bianco, The Mechanics of Futures Trading: Speculation and Manipulation,
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 28 (1977).
6. For a general explanation of the operation of the wheat futures market, see
Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
932 (1972).
7. T. HIERONYMOUS, THE ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING FOR COMMERCIAL AND
PERSONAL PROFrr 41-42 (2d ed. 1977).
8. See generally 7 U.S.C. §§ 6 to 6p, 13a, 13a-l, 13b, 13c (1976).
9. S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5843, 5844 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 93-1131 at -, [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
10. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976).
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The CFTC first used this power in connection with a widely traded
futures contract when it suspended trading in the Chicago Board
of Trade (Board) March, 1979, wheat contract." After the Board
successfully enjoined the enforcement of the suspension in federal
district court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
declaration of an emergency and the suspension of trading were
not judicially reviewable, but were committed by law to agency
discretion within the exception to judicial review created by the
APA.12 This note addresses the significance that this denial of ju-
dicial review has on the participants in the futures markets. No
attempt is made to enter into the academic debate as to the defini-
tion of a futures market manipulation. 13 The other enforcement
powers of the CFTC are only dealt with peripherally. Additionally,
this note examines the effect an involuntary suspension of trading
has on those utilizing the futures markets to hedge14 and the corre-
sponding effect upon the speculators, the other essential partici-
pants in the futures markets.
15
II. BACKGROUND
When the CFTC suspended trading in the March, 1979, contract
on Thursday, March 15, 1979,16 there were four trading days left on
the contract during which a trader with either a long or short posi-
11. Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
12. 605 F.2d 1016 (1979).
13. For a discussion of the various theories and methods used to manipulate a
futures market, see generally: Hieronymus, Manipulation in Commodity Fu-
tures Trading: Toward a Definition, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 41 (1977); McDermott,
Defining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures
"Squeeze", 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 202 (1979); Case Comment, 57 MINN. L REV. 1243
(1973).
14. A "hedge" is a form of risk aversion, not insurance. It is created by assuming
a position in futures market which is equal and opposite to an already ex-
isting or immediately anticipated cash position. To hedge is an attempt to
insulate one's business activities from price level speculation while retaining
the opportunity to speculate in basis variation. In theory, the hedge would
insulate the hedger from price changes when both the cash and futures mar-
kets increase or decrease together, which makes it appear to be a form of
insurance. However, the hedger may have gains or losses on his transactions
if the futures and cash markets do not have parallel price changes, but rather
a widening or narrowing of the basis-the price difference in the cash and
futures price that reflects storage costs until the date of sale. T. HIERONYMUS,
supra note 7, at 148-54.
15. Speculators are a necessary component of a futures market because the
hedgers transfer their unwanted risk to them. Speculators also provide the
liquidity needed in the futures market. Naturally, they expect and receive a
return on their investments for providing these services. Indeed, the vast ma-
jority of the participants in the futures markets are speculators. See gener-
ally T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 7.
16. 605 F.2d at 1018. Initially the CFTC ordered only a one day suspension, but at
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tion could make a corresponding purchase or sale to close out his
interest. After the close of a contract trading period, the contract
entered into by the trader with the futures market can only be sat-
isfied by delivery, or acceptance and payment for delivery, accord-
ing to the manner prescribed by the futures exchanges. In this
commodity (wheat), the Board allows a trader to satisfy the con-
tract by making or taking delivery before the end of the calendar
month, in this case the 31st of March.17 This practice allows the
trader ten days leeway once he finds out his contract position can-
not be offset in another futures trade.
The CFTC was responding to what it perceived as "significant
transportation and warehouse facility shortages' u 8 which, when
viewed together with the large open long position of a small
number of traders, 9 could conceivably cause the market to inaccu-
rately reflect the forces of supply and demand. As a further basis
for its decision, the CFTC referred to the "distortion of the price
relationships between the contract and other values of wheat. '20
This apparently was a reference to parallel price movements in the
cash market, which were not corresponding in the manner usual
for the close of a contract.
The CFTC feared a classic "short squeeze." This situation re-
sults when those in a long position in the contract are able to de-
termine the price the short traders have to pay to liquidate their
contracts by controlling both the cash market (the deliverable sup-
ply) and the futures market (with their dominant long position) at
the close of the trading month.2 ' The Board responded to the ini-
tial CFTC suspension by immediately declaring an emergency
under its own rules and limiting trading to liquidation of existing
positions only.22 The Board believed that the CFTC's act of sus-
pending trading made liquidation-only trading necessary, and that
the end of that day, a supplemental order was issued suspending trade for
the remainder of the contract.
17. Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
18. For the CFTC's reasons for suspending trading, see 605 F.2d at 1018-19.
19. As previously stated, see text accompanying note 6 supra, futures trading in-
volves entering into contracts for future delivery of the traded commodity. A
trader in a long open position has gone "long" when he has made an agree-
ment to deliver the trading unit of the commodity, but he is still "open" be-
cause he has not yet made the corresponding purchase of a "short" contract
for delivery in order to cancel his involvement in the market. Either "long" or
"short" positions of traders of a certain size must be reported to the exchange
where the commodity is traded. The reporting requirements for the wheat
contract are given in 17 C.F.R. § 15.01-.03 (1977).
20. 605 F.2d at 1018-19.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. If an emergency is declared, no new long positions could be taken, and only
existing long positions could be sold to a short trader to close out his interest.
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the Board's actions during the prior two weeks to control the liqui-
dation of the contract had been successful.23 Based on this belief,
the Board challenged the suspension of the final three days of trad-
ing in a suit filed on Saturday, March 17, 1979.
The Board asserted that the CFTC's actions were arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, and in
excess of statutory authority because no emergency within the
provisions of the statute existed. The Board asked the district
court to enjoin the CFTC's enforcement of its trading suspension
in order to allow the contract to trade out. The court granted the
injunction after an evidentiary hearing held on Sunday, March 18,
1979, basing this decision on the testimony of five experts called by
the Board, that, as defined by statute, no emergency existed.24 The
CFTC had presented no evidence, but had stood on the position
that its action was not reviewable, and immediately filed an appeal
and a motion for a stay of the injunction pending the appeal.
The court of appeals declined to stay the injunction which sus-
pended the final three days of trading, basing its decision on the
CFTC's failure to rebut the charges of arbitrariness made in con-
nection with the discretionary suspension. When the appeal was
heard, the court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that
judicial review of the CFTC's determination that an emergency ex-
isted was precluded by the APA.
25
I. THE ANALYSIS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
Before examining the question of whether the CFTC's action
was reviewable, the court of appeals disposed of two motions to
dismiss made by the Board. The Board based these motions on
the grounds of mootness, and further, on the fact that the merits of
the appeal by the CFTC had been heard by its motion to stay the
injunction. The court found that while the injunction expired at
the end of March, the issue satisfied the exception to dismissal for
mootness since it was "capable of repetition yet evading review. ' '26
The court also held that the denial of the stay was a discretionary
ruling, and not a review on the merits, in spite of the denial's lan-
guage which based the refusal to grant a stay on the CFTC's failure
to rebut the charge of arbitrariness.
2 7
23. The Board had been encouraging long traders to sell since the first of March
so as to limit the effect of the supply imbalance. Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1979, at 4,
col. 1.
24. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1976).
26. 605 F.2d at 1020 (citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911)).
27. 605 F.2d at 1020.
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The refusal to dismiss forced the court to determine whether
the CFTC's action was reviewable, and, if so, to decide whether the
district court correctly found that no emergency existed. The court
of appeals focused on the 1974 Act's grant of authority to the CFTC,
and found that the agency's action fell within the exception to judi-
cial review presented in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2).28 The court based its
holding on the language and the legislative history of the emer-
gency provision, and on the purpose and structure of the 1974 Act
as a whole.
The court interpreted the language of the emergency provision
to commit the determination of the existence of an emergency to
agency discretion. By employing the statutory language which
states "whenever it has reason to believe that an emergency ex-
ists", and limiting the types of emergencies the CFTC could act on,
the court found that Congress had carefully designated the discre-
tion that was to be used.29 The court found nothing in the statu-
tory language to indicate that the district court could substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the CFTC. The lower court's action
was viewed as an unacceptable determination on the merits that
no statutorily defined emergency existed.
The court then examined the structure of the 1974 Act as a
whole, and analogized from other provisions which grant the CFTC
authority to act on the basis of its "reason to believe." 30 It found
that these provisions constitute a comprehensive regulatory
scheme to regulate the growing and volatile futures markets. The
court noted that this was a congressional authorization to take
emergency action in an area where traditional administrative and
injunctive remedies were not particularly well suited. Asserting
that Congress intended to provide the.CFTC with "a strong law
which will enable it to regulate both agricultural and non-agricul-
tural goods and services in the public interest,"3' the court be-
lieved that the allowance of judicial interference asked for in this
case, would frustrate that intent.
To buttress this conclusion, the court cited several cases in
which an analogous grant of power to act in an emergency situa-
tion had been held to be unreviewable.32 Of particular note are
Daugherty Lumber Company v. United States33 and United States
28. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
29. For further elaboration of the court's reasoning, see 605 F.2d at 1022 n.7.
30. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13a-13c (1976).
31. S. REP. No. 93-1131 at 19, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5860.
32. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Inc.,
339 U.S. 594 (1950); United States v. Southern Ry. Co., 364 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967); Daugherty Lumber Co. v. United
States, 141 F. Supp. 576 (D. Or. 1956).
33. 141 F. Supp. 576 (D. Or. 1956).
1981]
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v. Southern Railway Company,34 which were concerned with a
similar discretionary grant of emergency power to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). 35 The ICC emergency power al-
lowed it to direct rail car usage in times when it perceived a
shortage. The courts in those cases had found the ICC's power
was unreviewable because the statutory emergency provision
granted to the ICC the power to act whenever, in its opinion, the
public good required the sacrifice of individual rights. However,
neither of these cases raised the issue of whether there had been
an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power.
The court concluded its consideration of the reviewability of the
CFTC decision by examining the legislative history of the emer-
gency provision. The Act was aimed at creating a regulatory
scheme similar to that of the Security Exchange Commission, and
in order to do this, the CFTC would need the power to regulate not
only the participants in the futures markets, but the exchanges
themselves.3 6 While it was accepted that the emergency provision
was one means to this end, substantial disagreement existed be-
tween the House of Representatives and the Senate as to how to
limit their power over the exchanges. The House proposal would
have allowed the use of the emergency power whenever the CFITC
had reason to believe that conditions threatened orderly trading
in, or liquidation of, any futures contract.3 7 The Senate opposed
such a broad grant of power, and chose instead to limit the exer-
cise of this emergency power to those instances where failure to
exercise the power would cause a greater adverse impact on the
market than the CFTC's proposed action. The Senate thought that
over-use of the emergency power would create doubt and appre-
hension in the futures market participants, who feared abrogation
or alteration of the sanctity of their contract by arbitrary govern-
ment action.3 8 The statute as ultimately passed adopted the Sen-
ate proposal, but without the greater adverse impact language,
because the House Conference Committee felt that the CFTC
could not possibly make such a determination at the time when an
34. 364 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967).
35. The provision granting the ICC this power reads in part as follows:
Whenever the Commission is of opinion that shortage of equip-
ment, congestion of traffic, or other emergency requiring immediate
action exists. . . , the Commission shall have, and it is given, author-
ity. . . (b) to make such just and reasonable directions with respect
to car service . . . as in its opinion will best promote the service in
the interest of the public ....
49 U.S.C. § 11(15) (1976).
36. S. REP. No. 93-1131 at 18, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5859.
37. H. R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ai. NEWS 5867, 5879.
38. S. REP. No. 93-1131 at 25, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5865-66.
[Vol. 60:152
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emergency order was issued.39
In light of these committee decisions, the court of appeals de-
termined that Congress recognized that effective regulation re-
quired an expert agency with powers beyond traditional
enforcement powers. The congressional attention directed to the
limits of the CFTC's extraordinary emergency power, caused the
court to find that Congress had limited the area in which the
CFTC's discretion was to operate, and that, within this area, the
expertise of the agency should control. The court further asserted
that judicial review of such CFTC exercises of discretion and ex-
pertise would thwart the very purpose for which Congress had au-
thorized the exercise of emergency power. Although this was
recognized as an exception to the general rule allowing judicial re-
view,40 the court of appeals concluded it was statutorily bound to
reverse the district court's review because of 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2).41
IV. ANALYSIS
The court of appeals' analysis of the legislative history and lan-
guage of the emergency provision appears to place the CFTC's dis-
cretionary action beyond review. However, the court failed to
address the Board's allegation that the action was arbitrary, capri-
cious, and an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, and
in excess of statutory authority; all claims which fall within the
scope of review provision of the APA.42 In addition, the court ig-
nored its earlier ruling refusing to stay the district court's injunc-
tion because of the failure of the CFTC to rebut the charge of an
arbitrary exercise of discretion. Finally, the court of appeals gave
39. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5894, 5899-5900.
40. The case often cited as establishing a general presumption of reviewability is
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), which held that review of
final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is
persuasive reason to believe that such was the intent of Congress.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), provides in part that-
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the review-
ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall-....
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and con-
clusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right.
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summary treatment to the Supreme Court's consideration of the
"committed to agency discretion" dilemma by relegating to a foot-
note 43 its consideration of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe44 which had been invoked by the Board in order to apply the
"law to apply" rationale 45 to avoid the exception to judicial review.
These inconsistencies are not too disturbing if one accepts the
notion that the CFTC's emergency action was necessary to prevent
a manipulation of the short traders. Such undesirable conduct
(manipulation) would be a prime example of the "demoralizing
form of speculation""6 harmful to the public interest. This
"proper" exercise of agency expertise and discretion would neces-
sarily sacrifice the private interests of a few traders (i.e., those de-
prived of the opportunity to close their contracts by choosing
between delivery or corresponding futures trade) in order to pro-
tect the broad public interest. It must be pointed out, however,
that this notion ignores the fact that in this case, the March con-
tract, which continued to be traded only due to the filing of suit by
the Board, finished the month with little, if any, price fluctuation.47
Also ignored is the impact of the expert testimony heard at the
evidentiary hearing. If the trading suspension by the CFTC had
been allowed to stand by the district court, the result would have
been damage to the Board's reputation. In addition, traders would
have been deprived of their right to operate in the market, and the
profit that is necessary to insure the participation of speculators
within the market, in order to provide liquidity in the contract and
risk spreading for hedgers, would have been limited. These harms
and deprivations should occur only when the public interest de-
mands it and judicial review to protect these private rights should
not be precluded. While the courts should not interfere with the
sound exercise of discretion by agencies, the presumption in favor
of agency action should not be the sole basis for a refusal to protect
individuals, particularly when the allegations are of the scope of
those made by the Board.
A. The Berger-Davis Split
Two noted academicians, Professor Raoul Berger of Stanford
and Professor Kenneth Culp Davis of the University of Chicago,
have debated, sometimes heatedly, the proper role of the judiciary
43. 605 F.2d at 1022 n.8.
44. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
45. See notes 68-78 & accompanying text infra.
46. S. REP. No. 93-1131, at 1, [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 5844.
47. The prices for the final three days of trading were: $3.77, Wall St. J., Mar. 20,
1979, at 38, col. 2; $3.77, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1979, at 38, col. 2; and $3.74, Wall St.
J., Mar. 22, 1979, at 38, col. 2.
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in reviewing agency action.48 Each has considered and compared
at length the relationship of the general grant of judicial review
within 5 U.S.C. § 556 and the specific exception in section 701(a) (2)
for acts "committed to agency discretion by law," with the specific
provision for judicial review for an abuse of discretion in section
706.4 9 In their attempts to harmonize these provisions, each has
reached different conclusions: Professor Berger favors judicial re-
view in all situations where there is a question of abuse in the ex-
ercise of discretion, while Professor Davis finds a much more
limited review of exercises of discretion.
Both scholars agree, however, that read literally, the two provi-
sions of the APA do not make sense.50 They agree that the legisla-
tive history of the APA is conflicting and confusing and that it does
not conclusively support either point of view. Indeed, each has
found that the legislative history supports his view. 51 Berger and
Davis both agree with the Supreme Court's statement that "there
is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbi-
trary power,"5 2 yet they disagree as to its application to the ques-
tion of whether the courts should review all arbitrary exercises of
agency discretion.
Davis and Berger differ because they focus on different statu-
tory language. Professor Davis begins his analysis by formulating
three categories: (1) exercises of discretion; (2) proper exercises
of discretion; and (3) abuse of discretion.5 3 In order to rationalize
48. In chronological order. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Re-
view, 65 COLUM. L REV. 55 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Article];
4 K. DAVIS ADmINSTRATIw LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (1958, Supp. 1970 & Supp.
1976) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvis, TREATISE]; Berger, Administrative Arbi-
trariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 783 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Berger, Reply]; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final
Word, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 814 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Final Word];
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor Davis' "Final
Word", 114 U. PA. L. REV. 816 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Rejoinder];
Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L REv. 823
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Postscript]; Berger, Administrative Arbi-
trariness: A Sequel, 51 Mi-N. L. REV. 601 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Berger,
Sequel]; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51
MIN. L. REv. 643 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Not Always].
49. See notes 2 & 42 supra. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1976) with 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1976).
50. See Berger's "literal reading" in Berger, Article, supra note 48, at 58-62; Ber-
ger, Reply supra note 48, at 788-89; Davis' "literal reading" in Davis, Post-
script, supra note 48, at 823-25.
51. See Berger, Sequel, supra note 48, at 614-19 (confusion is in terms of review-
ability in general, not specifically for abuse of discretion); Davis, Postscript,
supra note 48, at 826.
52. See Berger, Article, supra note 48, at 57; Davis, Final Word, supra note 48, at
815.
53. Davis, Not Always, supra note 48, at 647. The explanatory analogy offered by
1981]
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the conflicting statutory provisions, Professor Davis emphasizes
the word "committed" in section 701(a) (2) in order to support his
conclusion that "committed to agency discretion" and "unreview-
able" have, in this limited context, the same meaning. If an action
is "committed" to agency discretion by the terms of the statute or
prior case law, it is unreviewable; if it is reviewable under the ex-
isting case law then it has not been "committed" to agency discre-
tion.54 To determine whether agency action is reviewable or
committed to agency discretion, (i.e., unreviewable), Davis incor-
porates the pre-APA case law. In effect, Davis treats the exception
provisions of section 701 consistently by finding that section
701 (a) (1) deals with explicit statutory direction that an action is
not judicially reviewable, and determining that section 701(a) (2)
deals with implicit removal from judicial review on the basis of
past treatment of the exercise of discretion.
Professor Berger views discretion and abuse of discretion as
complete opposites. 55 Professor Berger's analysis differs from that
of Professor Davis in that he chooses to focus on the section
706 (2) (A) language of "or otherwise not in accordance with law,"
and its relation to the section 701(a) (2) language of "committed to
agency discretion by law." Section 706 catalogs a number of im-
proper actions, including abuse of discretion which Congress
found to be "not in accordance with law." Since abuse in the exer-
cise of discretion is not in accordance with the law, it cannot be
committed by law to agency discretion. The effect is that a proper
exercise of discretion precludes a claim of abuse of discretion or
arbitrariness while an arbitrary exercise or abuse of discretion
could not be the sort of exercise of discretion Congress intended to
be committed by law to agency discretion.5 6 The crux of the differ-
ences in the interpretation of reviewability reached by Professors
Berger and Davis lies in the fact that each puts his emphasis on
different words in the statutory sections.
The cases decided at the height of this scholarly debate are con-
strued by both scholars to support their respective positions. The
debate pre-dates the Overton Park decision, but the Supreme
Court cites the Berger viewpoint to support its review of the
agency action then at issue.57 This Supreme Court opinion is
Professor Davis contains the following elements: (1) animals, (2) male ani-
mals and (3) female animals. Elements (2) and (3) are subsets of (1) in both
instances.
54. Davis, Postscript, supra note 48, at 825.
55. Berger, Article, supra note 48, at 61; Berger, Reply, supra note 48, at 791-92.
56. Berger, Article, supra note 48, at 61; Berger, Reply, supra note 48, at 788-89;
Berger, Sequel, supra note 48, at 609.
57. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
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severely criticized by Professor Davis.5 8 Confusion continues to
exist within the area as is reflected in the present case law con-
struction of the judicial review exception of section 701(a) (2).59
The case law indicates that a court will seek to utilize which-
ever of the Berger-Davis rationales will allow it to justify the par-
ticular conclusion reached in the case. It is worthy to note that, in
some instances, the Berger analysis has not made much of an im-
pact, particularly in those areas traditionally granted deference by
the judicial system. One such area is that of foreign policy. The
Davis view is implicitly followed in this area since judicial review
has never been allowed (i.e., a common law of nonreviewability
exists), in spite of Professor Berger's assertion that the Supreme
Court has not precluded such review. Berger points out that the
Supreme Court has held it to be an error to assume that foreign
policy is beyond judicial review.60
It seems that one or both of the scholars' positions merit consid-
eration in light of the district court's decision to grant relief based
on the Board's section 706 claims and the reliance of the court of
appeals on section 701 (a) (2) in order to preclude review. While
invocation by the Board of nearly all the claims for review within
section 706 may have confused the issue for the court, this shotgun
approach specifically invoked the debated issue of review for
abuse of discretion. By such a triggering, Berger's analysis would
have required judicial review of some of the allegations made by
the Board. This initial review (to determine if there was a sound
exercise of agency discretion as committed by law or an abuse of
agency discretion not in accordance with law) would be quite sim-
ple. The CFTC would be required to explain its action rather than
simply standing on the position that its actions were unreview-
able.61 By granting this initial stage of judicial review, a court
58. 4 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 48, at § 28.16.
59. Compare Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (limited review of SEC actions in applying NEPA) with Save The
Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency, 556 F.2d 1282
(5th Cir. 1977) (no review of a refusal by the EPA to veto a state agency's
permit to allow plant operation); and St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp.
Serv., Inc. 537 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1977) (no
review of Social Security Administration's denial of Medicare claims) and
Greater New York Hosp. Ass'n v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1976) (no
review of the timing of Medicare reimbursements by the Social Security Ad-
ministration) with Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975) (al-
lowed review of refusal to grant disability payments under the Social
Security Act). See also Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971) (granted
review); Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (same);
Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1966) (same).
60. Berger, Article, supra note 48, at 79.
61. See discussion of a possible standard of review in Section V infra.
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would not be substituting its limited expertise for that of the
agency's, but rather, would be protecting the rights of private indi-
viduals in the face of a deprivation that could only be justified if it
was truly for the benefit of the greater common good. The switch
by the court of appeals from an emphasis on the procedural
problems and possible harm to the public, due to the CF'C's lack
of capacity for swift and unfettered action, to the emphasis on the
effect on the participants in futures markets of the denial of review
for an arbitrary act by the CFTC would indicate that the court was
following the Berger approach.
It is also possible to employ the Davis approach to find that the
CFTC's emergency action was reviewable. If one views the
CFTC's act as based on a finding that there was a threatened ma-
nipulation which called for an invocation of emergency power, one
could apply the "committed to" test to the manipulation determi-
nation. In prior years, the courts were often involved in the set-
tling of alleged manipulations on various futures markets.
62
Assuming these court actions created a common law with respect
to manipulation, the grant of discretionary power in the 1974 Act
would therefore be treated as if it were the pre-APA law, and, in
essence, a common law limitation on the section 701(a) (2) excep-
tion to review. To hold otherwise is, in effect, to treat the discre-
tionary grant as within the explicit statutory exception to review of
section 701(a) (1), rather than within section 701(a) (2) as the court
of appeals had determined. If one applies this common law of ma-
nipulation instead of that of emergency situations, the necessity of
applying the law from areas other than the commodities field is
avoided. For instance, courts in futures market cases would not be
forced to analogize, as the court of appeals did in Chicago Board of
Trade, to the rail car shortage cases of Daugherty Lumber Com-
pany v. United States63 and United States v. Southern Railway
Company.64
B. Overton Park
The Board argued that the controlling precedent for its claims
was the Overton Park case.65 In Overton Park, the Supreme Court
was presented with the question of the reviewability of a determi-
nation by the Secretary of Transportation as to the route an inter-
62. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 932 (1972); Volkart Bros. Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962);
Great W. Food Distribs. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953). For the first
exception in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a), see note 2 supra.
63. 141 F. Supp. 576 (D. Or. 1956).
64. 364 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967).
65. 605 F.2d at 1022 n.8.
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state highway was to take through Memphis.66 The Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1968 provided that these highways were not to go
through parks unless there were no other "feasible and prudent
alternatives."67 The Secretary of Transportation had determined
there were no feasible and prudent alternatives to the route
through Overton Park and, when challenged, the Secretary as-
serted that his decision as to what constitutes "prudent" was a
grant of discretion.68
The Supreme Court allowed review of the Secretary's determi-
nation of "prudent," finding that the statutory language was
neither a clear and convincing expression of a legislative intent to
limit judicial review under section 701(a) (1), nor a "committed to
agency discretion" under the section 701(a) (2) exception. 69 The
Court stated that the legislative history of the APA indicated that
an action is committed to agency discretion "in those rare in-
stances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply. '70 Citing Professor Berger, the
Supreme Court further noted that this is a narrow exception.
71
The Court recognized that statutes are rarely drawn to provide "no
law to apply" because of the danger that such statutes will be un-
constitutionally vague. If there is truly no law to apply, the statute
would not withstand constitutional challenge under the doctrines
of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,72 which limit the delegation of
legislative powers. Since Congress does not work in a vacuum, it
appears that the law to apply in limiting such seemingly unconsti-
tutional grants of discretion would be the existing case law, and
the express statutory limits and expressions found within the leg-
islative history.
Utilizing the "law to apply" test of Overton Park, the court of
appeals examined the emergency provision of the 1974 Act and
found no law to apply. By focusing on the exercise of the emer-
gency power, it is not surprising that the court found there was no
law to apply, because this was a case of first impression-the first
time a major commodity contract had been suspended in a major
commodity exchange.73 Because the emergency provision is de-
fined in terms of manipulation, the court of appeals looked further
for "law to apply" but found that the term "manipulation" was not
66. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
67. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 18,82 Stat. 823, (codified
at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976)).
68. 401 U.S. at 405.
69. Id. at 410.
70. Id. at 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
71. 401 U.S. 410 n.23.
72. 293 U.S. 388 (1934).
73. Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1979, at 18, col. 2.
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defined within the 1974 Act. Thus, the court held that the emer-
gency provision was necessarily addressed to the expertise of the
CFTC. This analysis 74 ignores three things: (1) prior to the 1974
Act the problems of manipulation were left to the expertise of the
commodity exchanges themselves; (2) the facts show that the
Board still had considerable control of the market as shown by the
fact that the March contract liquidated out without the price fluctu-
ation that should have occurred if there had been a manipulation;
and (3) the courts had been regulating trading in commodities
without a legislative definition of manipulation 75 as demonstrated
in Great Western Foods, Inc. v. Brannan,76 Volkart Bros., Inc. v.
Freeman,77 and Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin.78 These cases illustrate the
"law to apply" on manipulation. By reading section 701(a) (2) to be
the narrow exception that the Overton Park decision claims it to
be, the court could have found "law to apply" on the determina-
tion of manipulation. This law could have served as the basis for
review.
If the CFTC's decision to suspend trading is read as falling
within the emergency provision language of "any other major mar-
ket disturbance,"7 9 rather than as being based on the fear of actual
or potential manipulation, the analysis must change. If this is in-
voked as the reason to suspend trading, a determination is neces-
sary as to what basic policy the CFTC should adopt in regulating
the futures markets; whether it should be activist and attempt to
prevent all major price fluctuations or whether it should assume a
passive role that allows the market to adjust to conditions so long
as there is not an artificial interference with the forces of supply
and demand. It would appear that if the CFTC exercises its discre-
tion in order to prevent a transportation and storage shortage from
causing a major market disturbance, the agency has interfered
with the futures markets in spite of the fact that the market was
accurately reflecting supply and demand.
When this type of CFTC action (interference when the market
accurately reflects supply and demand) is considered in light of
the apparent legislative intent to preserve the sanctity of the fu-
tures contract 80 and its concern for the effect a decline of the pub-
lic faith in the futures agreement would have, the agency's action
might be in violation of its statutory grant of authority. The fear of
74. 605 F.2d at 1022.
75. Confusion existed in the academic world as to what constituted a manipula-
tion. See note 13 supra.
76. 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953).
77. 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
78. 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
79. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976).
80. S. REP. No. 93-1131 at 25, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5865-66.
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governmental intervention in response to price fluctuations, such
as this severe supply shortage seemed to have caused, would drive
speculators from the market. This increased risk would cause
those who believe that their investment return does not merit in-
curring the greater risks resulting from governmental intervention
would withdraw from the market. This decrease in participation
would, in turn, injure the future markets themselves because Li-
quidity would decrease as participants dropped out. This would
lessen the risk-spreading afforded to hedgers and make the mar-
kets more prone to manipulation.
In addition, a localized supply shortage, such as that which oc-
curred in the March contract, is publicized. Traders have knowl-
edge of such shortages, unlike an actual or potential manipulation
situation. Thus, those traders who hold on to contracts in the face
of an announced shortage could be presumed to know what they
are doing, perhaps in expectation that the shortage would be alle-
viated to their advantage. These traders do not need government
protection. Some traders might even gamble on government inter-
vention of some sort, which arguably is the sort of activity the Sen-
ate feared when it discussed the limits that should be placed on
the emergency power. Therefore, the CFTC's actions can be
viewed as self-defeating because the action itself, not the external
factor, a publicized supply shortage, affected trading and violated
the sanctity of the futures contract.
V. CONCLUSION-SCOPE OF REVIEW IF GRANTED
Granting judicial review of the CFTC emergency action should
not lead the courts to ignore the previously mentioned reasons for
deferring to agency discretion. In the volatile and technical fu-
tures area, and in the face of an express legislative desire to create
a powerful and effective regulatory agency, the initial judicial re-
view should merely require the CFTC to make a "prima facie"
showing that its action was reasonable, in good faith and not arbi-
trary. In the case of manipulation, the CFTC's initial showing
could be satisfied quite simply by using the records on the behav-
ior of the futures markets which the commodity exchanges them-
selves are required to maintain for the benefit of the CFTC.
However, the CFTC would only be required to make this prima fa-
cie showing after some showing by a challenger that the agency's
action was in bad faith, arbitrary or otherwise impermissible.
For a manipulation, the CFTC might initially show a dominant
long position in the hands of a few speculators, and perhaps bol-
ster the appearance of potential manipulation by showing a split in
the basis between the contract month terminating and a subse-
quent trading month (provided they were within the same crop
1981]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
year).81 Then, by showing that control of the deliverable supply
was in the hands of these long traders, the CFTC would have made
its showing of reasonableness and good faith. If necessary this
showing could be done in camera to avoid privacy objections by
traders whose positions in the market might be revealed. This
analysis is simple and swift, since such records are already kept by
the commodity exchanges and such review could be implemented
very quickly (even over a weekend as was the case in Chicago
Board of Trade). This approach would enable the CFTC to remain
swift and effective in regulation, yet insure that, unless absolutely
necessary, the private rights of market participants are not sacri-
ficed for the public good.
Terry Curtiss '81
81. There is a broad proposition that the contract months within the same crop
year should reflect in their price differential only the storage costs of holding
to the later contract. Therefore, when the two months split by more than the
storage cost, some force is affecting the supply-demand determination for one
of the months, and absent a showing by the commodity exchange that this
split is not due to manipulative pressures, but some other economic force,
such as transportation shortages due to strikes or natural disasters the
CFTC's allegations should stand.
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